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Abstract
We develop a simple two period model to study the importance
of motivational differences among politicians in describing the role
of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians
differ in their motives of running public office. Good politicians care
about policies while bad politicians care about rent extraction. Voters
want to control politician misbehavior and to select good politicians.
We show that reelection concerns may compel a good politician not
to implement a socially desirable policy if he sufficiently cares about
the future. Second, reelection concerns may induce a bad politician
not to undertake a socially undesirable policy. The reason for this is
fear of being ruled by another bad politician if unseated. This finding
exhibits the disciplining function of elections. A striking result in our
paper is that bad politicians may act more in tune with the public
interest relative to the good politicians. (JEL: D72, D78, D82)
1 Introduction
Disciplining and selecting politicians is a main concern in representative
democracies. This concern stems from two core problems. First, motives
∗I would like to thank Klaas Beniers, Otto H. Swank, and seminar participants at
Erasmus University Rotterdam and at European Public Choice Soceity Conference 2005
for useful discussions and their comments. Corresponding address: Phongthorn Wrasai,
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of holding office differ among politicians. Some politicians are motivated by
a public spirit while others are more opportunistically motivated. It is well
known that citizens have weak incentives to acquire information. Second,
government decision making process endows politicians with bureaucrats act-
ing as their information providers. Accordingly politicians may exploit in-
formational superiority to further their own interest, which may not coincide
with the public interest.
To alleviate agency problems, elections are used as an incentive mecha-
nism, aimed at holding politicians accountable for their behavior and select-
ing good ones to run political office. Concerning the literature on electoral
accountability1, how elections function and how reelection incentives shape
politicians’ behavior and policy choices critically hinge on the nature of infor-
mational asymmetries between politicians and voters, and on the characteris-
tics of the politicians assumed in these studies. While most of the literature
has paid attention to differences in competence between politicians when
studying electoral control and policy processes, little has been focused on
the motivational differences of politicians in explaining those issues.
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of elections and the implica-
tions of reelection concerns on policy choices when the politicians’ motivation
matters. In our analysis, politicians differ in their motives of holding office.
Good politicians care about implemented policies whereas bad ones care not
only about the policies but also want to extract rents. When policies are sto-
chastic in nature, there are two implications. First, they create an incentive
for politicians to use policy implementation as ‘a rent extraction device’ to
appropriate resources at the expense of voters. Second, by observing the im-
plementation of policies, the voters are unable to tell whether the incumbent
is acting in their interest or simply extracting rent through policy imple-
mentation. To illustrate these repercussions, we employ a simple two-period
model. There are two players: an incumbent politician and a representative
voter. The motivation of the incumbent politician is private information. In
the first period the incumbent politician must make a decision as to whether
or not to implement a particular policy. The representative voter observes
the policy decision but not its real consequences. Elections are held. The
voter decides whether or not to reelect the incumbent. In the second period,
the winning politician takes office and chooses the second-period policy.
Our analysis leads to the following results. First, reelection concerns may
1See Berganza (2000b) for a comprehensive survey.
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distort policy choices made by a good politician. In particular, we show that
a good politician may choose not to implement a socially desirable policy if
he sufficiently fears rent extraction in the future. The intuition behind the
result is straightforward. Suppose voters dismiss the incumbent politician
when implementation is observed. If a good politician chooses to implement
a good policy, he knows that he will be dismissed and with some positive
probability a bad politician will be in office in the future. On the other
hand, preserving the status quo implies that the good policy will not be
implemented. However, the benefits of doing so are that the good politician
prevents a bad politician holding office in the future period. Accordingly not
implementing a good policy today is the price to be paid for preventing a bad
politician from holding office tomorrow. The inclination of a good politician
not to implement a good policy depends on the scope of concerns over future
rent appropriation, the likelihood that a bad politician will be in office, and
the discrepancy between good and bad policy.
Second, reelection concerns may deter a bad politician from implement-
ing a socially undesirable policy. This finding exhibits the disciplining effect
of elections: elections reduce opportunistic behavior by bad politicians. The
benefits to the voter are 1) a socially undesirable policy does not get imple-
mented 2) rents are not appropriated in the current period. The result above
is driven by a bad politician’s re-election incentives. Also, elections give an
incentive for a bad politician to postpone rent extraction. This accentuates
the importance of tying politicians’ performances in their final term with
future prospect of their well-being.
Third, three types of equilibria exist: a disciplining equilibrium, a cyni-
cal equilibrium, and a timid equilibrium2. Which of these equilibria arises,
depends on the extent to which the incumbent politician cares about the
following: future prospects of rent extraction, likelihood that a bad politi-
cian enters office, and the significance of policy decisions in that good policy
should be undertaken and bad policy should be maintained the status quo.
One equilibrium is particular striking. In the ‘cynical’ equilibrium, an
attempt of a good politician to avoid future rent extraction by a bad politi-
cian may induce him not to implement a good policy. On the contrary, a
bad politician does implement a good policy. When voters do not suffer
much from rent extraction, a policy implemented by a bad politician may
2We have borrowed this term from Smart and Strum (2004).
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be beneficial to them. By ignoring the consequences of the future term, a
bad politician appears to act more in line with the public interest than a
good politician in the present term. As a good politician does not always
implement a good policy while a bad politician does and sometimes brings
benefit to the voters, the voters are not anymore able to infer a politician’s
motivation from observing politicians’ behavior. Moreover, it is worth men-
tioning that even in this cynical world, we show that elections improve the
likelihood that a good politician enters office in the future.
This paper is closely related to the literature on electoral accountability,
pioneered by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), and further developed by
Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) and Banks and Sundaram (1993). In this
literature, the desire for reelection is at the heart of politicians. However, re-
election incentives differ among models. For instance, politicians may desire
to be in office because of ego rent as discussed in Rogoff (1990). The desire
for reelection may also come from the expectation that holding office gives an
opportunity to extract rents and/or to implement strongly preferred policies
in the future. As we show in the paper, under the nature of asymmetric
information where politicians with different motivations operate in our set-
ting, differences in reelection incentives by good and bad politicians have
important implication in politicians’ behavior, voters’ re-electing strategies,
and the roles of elections.
Our paper also builds on Coate and Morris (1995). There voters have
asymmetric information both about the effects of policies and about politi-
cians’ predispositions. They show that an inefficiently devious method to
transfer resources through policy implementation rather than an efficient
and simple method like a cash transfer may be employed. The similarity be-
tween their paper and ours is the importance of imperfect information on the
part of voters. While their study focuses on the forms of making transfers by
politicians, we instead focus on the functions of elections and policy choices
under the asymmetric information above.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section
presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibria and articulates the
results. Section 4 concludes.
4
2 The model
Consider a simple two-period game of incomplete information. In each pe-
riod, there are two active players: an incumbent politician and a representa-
tive voter.
2.1 Policies
In each period t = 1, 2, a policy Xt has to be decided whether it should
be implemented, Xt = 1 or preserved the status quo, Xt = 0. The con-
sequences of the policy are surrounded by uncertainty — i.e. they produce
either bad or good consequences, µt ∈ {−h, h} with equal probability. An
implemented policy with socially desirable consequences yields the positive
benefit of h while a policy with socially undesirable consequences yields the
negative benefit of −h.
2.2 Incumbent politician
The incumbent politician observes µt. There are two types of politicians,
θt ∈ {G,B}. Incumbent politician’s type is his private information. With
probability ω, the politician is good (θ = G); with probability 1 − ω, he
is bad (θ = B). A bad politician wants to appropriate rent. Specifically
we assume that if a policy is implemented by a good politician, the payoff
to the representative voter (henceforth the voter) equals µ. When a bad
politician implements a policy, the payoff to the voter is µt − γR, where R
denotes the extracted rent and γ measures how much the voter suffers from
the extraction of the rent. When the status quo is maintained, the payoff
to the voter and the incumbent politician, irrespective of his type, equals
zero. A good politician cares about the public interest. When Xt = 1,
his payoff equals µt. When a bad politician implements a policy, his payoff
equals µt + R. Notice that the appropriation of rent requires Xt = 1. We
assume that −h+R > 0, implying that a bad politician has an incentive to
implement a socially undesirable policy (µt = −h) to extract the rent. The
incumbent politician’s preferences are summarized by:
UG(Xt = 1) = µt (1)
UB(Xt = 1) = µt +R
UG(Xt = 0) = UB(Xt = 0) = 0
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2.3 Representative voter
The representative voter is concerned about implementation outcomes which
are composed of two parts: policy outcomes itself and rent appropriation if
a bad politician is in office. The voter’s preferences are thus given by:
UV (Xt = 1) = µt − γR (2)
UV (Xt = 0) = 0
where γ captures the extent to which the voter suffers from the extraction
of the rent. The payoff to the voter is normalized to zero if the status quo is
retained. At the end of period 1, elections are held. The voter can keep the
incumbent (υ = 0) or dismiss him (υ = 1). If the incumbent is dismissed,
then in period 2 the politician will be good with probability ω and bad with
probability 1 − ω. When voting, the voter observes the decision on X1 but
does not observe outcomes (µt and R). As we will show below, the reason for
holding elections in our model is twofold. First, it increases the probability
that in period 2 a good incumbent holds office. Second, elections may keep
a bad politician from appropriating a rent in period 1.
2.4 Timing
Nature first determines µ1 ∈ {−h, h} and the incumbent politician discovers
his type from θ ∈ {G,B}. The incumbent observes µ1 and decides whether
to implement the policy (X1 = 1) or to preserve the status quo (X1 = 0).
The voter observes the policy decision made by the incumbent. Subsequently
the voter decides whether to re-elect the incumbent (υ = 0) or to dismiss
him (υ = 1). The second period is identical to the first period, with a new
policy, X2, a new state of the world, µ2 ∈ {−h, h}, and, if υ = 1, a new
incumbent. To simplify notation, we abstract from discounting the future.3
3We are aware that with some discounting, a bad politician may have an incentive to
take all rents in period 1.
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Table 1. The description of the model
Players: The incumbent politician and the representative voter
Timing:
Period 1
• Nature determines µ1 ∈ {−h, h} and θ1 ∈ {G,B}.
• The incumbent observes µ1 and chooses X1 ∈ {X1 = 0, X1 = 1}.
• The voter observes X1 and then chooses υ ∈ {υ = 0, υ = 1}.
Period 2
• Nature determines µ2 ∈ {−h, h}; and if υ = 1, θ2 ∈ {G,B}.
• The winning incumbent observes µ2 and choosesX2 ∈ {X2 = 0,X2 = 1}.
• The game ends.
Payoffs:
UG(Xt = 1) = µt; UG(Xt = 0) = 0.
UB(Xt = 1) = µt +R; UB(Xt = 0) = 0.
UV (Xt = 1) = µt − γR; UV (Xt = 0) = 0.
Assumptions:
−h+R > 0.
3 Analysis
3.1 Equilibrium in the second-period game
The strategies of the two types of politician in the second period directly
follow from the assumptions made above. The assumption that −h+R > 0
implies that in period 2 a bad politician chooses X2 = 1, irrespective of the
state of the world. By assumption, a good politician opts for X2 = 1 if and
only if µ2 = h. Clearly, it is in the voter’s interest to have a good politician
in office in period 2.
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3.2 Equilibrium in the first-period game
An important feature of our model is that relative to a good politician, a bad
politician is biased towards implementation. We therefore suppose that the
voter dismisses the incumbent, v = 1, if and only if X1 = 1. Later we will
verify whether this strategy is an optimal response for the voter.
Consider a good politician in period 1. Suppose µ1 = −h. Then, clearly
the good politician has no incentive to chooseX1 = 1 as a bad policy would be
implemented and with probability 1−ω the good politician would be replaced
by a bad politician. Thus, if µ1 = −h, then it is an optimal response for the
good politician to choose X1 = 0. Now suppose µ1 = h. The good politician
faces a trade-off. On the one hand, choosing X1 = 1 implies that he will be
dismissed. Then, with probability 1− ω a bad politician will be in office in
period 2. On the other hand, X1 = 0 implies that a good policy will not
be implemented. Anticipating his behavior in period 2, X1 = 0 yields an
expected payoff to the good politician (and to the voter) equal to:
UG (X1 = 0 | µ1 = h) =
1
2
h (3)
Choosing X1 = 1 yields an expected utility:
UG (X1 = 1 | µ1 = h) = h+ ω
1
2
h− (1− ω) γR (4)
A comparison between (3) and (4) shows that X1 = 1 increases period 1
utility (h), but reduces period 2 utility. Clearly, X1 = 1 yields a higher
payoff than X1 = 0 if:
γR < 1
2
1 + ω
1− ωh (5)
The intuition behind (5) is simple. The benefits of choosing X1 = 0 is that
the good politician prevents a bad politician from entering office in period 2.
The higher γR is, the higher the costs of a bad politician are. Moreover, the
lower ω is, the higher the probability is of a bad politician entering office in
period 2 when choosing X1 = 1. Finally, the higher h is, the more important
it is that a policy is implemented when µ1 = h and not implemented when
µ1 = −h. Thus, a lower γR, a higher ω, and a higher h widen the range of
parameters for which a good politician chooses X1 = 1. If (5) is violated,
then a good politician always choosesX1 = 0. ChoosingX1 = 0 when µ1 = h
(not implementing a good policy) is the price to be paid for preventing a bad
politician to take office in period 2.
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Lemma 1 Suppose that the voter dismisses the incumbent, v = 1, if X1 = 1.
Then, a good politician may opt for not implementing a good policy to avoid
future rent extraction.
Now consider a bad politician. Suppose µ1 = −h. Then, X1 = 1 yields a
payoff equal to:
UB (X1 = 1 | µ1 = −h) = −h+R+ ω
1
2
h− (1− ω) γR (6)
and X1 = 0 yields:
UB (X1 = 0 | µ1 = −h) = R
Consequently, X1 = 1 delivers a higher payoff than X1 = 0 if:
γR <
1
2
ω − 1
1− ω h (7)
It is easy to see that condition (7) is always violated. Hence, when µ1 = −h,
it is an optimal response for a bad politician to choose X1 = 0. This finding
illustrates the potential disciplining function of elections. Elections lead a
bad politician to abstain from implementing a socially undesirable policy.
The benefit for the voter is twofold. First, a bad policy is not implemented.
Second, in period 1 rents are not appropriated. The reason why R discour-
ages a bad politician from implementing an undesirable policy is that a bad
politician also does not want to be reigned by a bad politician. As a result,
elections give an incentive to a bad politician to postpone rent appropriation.
Now suppose µ1 = h. X1 = 1 yields a payoff:
UB (X1 = 1 | µ1 = h) = h+R+ ω
1
2
h− (1− ω) γR (8)
Again, X1 = 0 yields R. Consequently, a bad politician chooses X1 = 1 if:
γR < 2 + ω
2(1− ω)h (9)
Equation (9) shows that a high rent (γR), a low value of h, and a low value
of ω may keep a bad politician from choosing X1 = 1 and appropriating a
rent in period 1.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the voter dismisses the incumbent, v = 1, if X1 = 1.
Then, a bad politician never implements a policy when µ1 = −h, and may
abstain from implementing a policy when µ1 = h.
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On the basis of (5) and (9), three situations can be distinguished.
A cynical equilibrium ((5) is violated and (9) is satisfied)
If (5) is violated and (9) is satisfied, then in period 1 a good politician retains
the status quo, irrespective of the state of the world, and a bad politician
implements the policy only if µ1 = h. Notice that given these strategies, the
assumed voting rule is an optimal response. Voting for the incumbent (v = 0)
if and only if X1 = 0 maximizes the probability that in period 2 a good
politician holds office. If γ is sufficiently small, then the voter benefits from
a policy that is implemented by a bad politician (h− γR > 0). Accordingly,
when we ignore the consequences for period 2, in period 1 a bad politician
acts more in line with the voter’s interest than a good politician (hence a
cynical equilibrium). The reason for this is that a good politician does not
implement a socially desirable policy. The cost of giving up a desirable policy
is smaller than the benefit of having a good politician in office in period 2.
The following proposition summarizes this phenomenon.
Proposition 1 Suppose γR > 1
2
1+ω
1−ωh and γR <
2+ω
2(1−ω)h. Then an equilib-
rium exists in which v = 0 if and only if X1 = 0; a good politician chooses
X1 = 0, irrespective of µ1; and a bad politician chooses X1 = 1 if and only if
µ1 = h.
It is worth emphasizing that in the cynical equilibrium elections have two
constructive functions. First, elections discipline bad politicians. In period 1,
policies that are socially undesirable are not implemented. Without elections,
a bad politician would always choose X1 = 1. Second, elections improve the
probability that in period 2 a good politician holds office. Without elections,
this probability would be ω; with elections, it is ω + 1
2
(1− ω).
A timid equilibrium (both (5) are (9) violated)
If (5) and (9) are both violated, then in period 1 both types of politicians
retain the status quo, irrespective of the state of the world. Is the voting
rule "re-elects the incumbent if and only if X1 = 0" an optimal response to
the politicians’ strategies. The answer to this question depends on the out
of equilibrium belief when X1 = 1. As bad politicians are relatively biased
towards X1 = 1, a natural out of equilibrium belief is Pr (θ1 = B | X1 = 1) =
1. With this belief, the strategies of the two types of politicians mentioned
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above in conjunction with the assumed voting rule form an equilibrium of the
period 1 game. A timid equilibrium describes a situation in which politicians
remain passive. From the conditions (5) and (9), it directly follows that a
timid equilibrium exists if the voter suffers much from rent appropriation
(high γR), the chances of having a bad politician are high (low ω), and the
value of good and bad policies do not differ much (low h).
Proposition 2 Suppose γR > 1
2
1+ω
1−ωh and γR >
2+ω
2(1−ω)h. Then an equilib-
rium exists in which v = 0 if and only if X1 = 0; a good politician as well as
a bad politician choose X1 = 0, irrespective of µ1.
In a timid equilibrium, elections only have one function: disciplining bad
politicians. Since bad and good politicians act in the same way in period 1,
elections do not help to increase the probability that a good politician holds
office in period 2.
A disciplining equilibrium (both (5) are (9) satisfied)
If (5) and (9) are both satisfied, then in period 1 both types of politicians
retain the status quo, if and only if µ1 = h. When h − γR > 0, these
strategies imply that good policies are implemented and bad policies are
not implemented. Is v = 0 if and only if X1 = 0 a best response to these
strategies? The answer is in the affirmative, as the policy implementation
decision does not contain information about the politician’s type. In fact,
at elections the voter is indifferent between re-electing and dismissing the
incumbent.
Proposition 3 Suppose γR < 1
2
1+ω
1−ωh and γR <
2+ω
2(1−ω)h. Then an equilib-
rium exists in which v = 0 if and only if X1 = 0; a good politician as well as
a bad politician choose X1 = 1 if and only if µ1 = h.
As in the timid equilibrium, in the disciplining equilibrium elections only
serve the purpose of disciplining bad politicians in period 1.
All three equilibria are illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Characterization of the three equilibria
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have developed a simple two-period model to gain insights
into the importance of differences in motivation among politicians and its
implications for understanding the role of elections and explaining policy
choices. We derive the following results. First, our analysis suggests that
the disciplining function of elections plays its role in all political equilibria.
Elections discipline opportunistic politicians to abstain from implementing a
socially undesirable policy. Without elections, they would always implement
any policy irrespective of the state of the world. Second, as shown in the
cynical equilibrium, elections perform another function. They improve the
likelihood that a good politician enters office tomorrow. A striking result in
this equilibrium is that a bad politician, by implementing a socially desirable
policy, may instead act more in tune with the public interest as a good politi-
cian chooses not to implement a socially desirable policy. Accordingly, when
voters care sufficiently less about rent extraction, the policy implemented by
a rent-seeking politician may benefit to the voters.
Additionally, elections may also create an incentive for an opportunis-
tic politician to postpone an extraction of the rents. This reminds us that
elections alone do not guarantee proper functioning of modern democracies.
Other complementary institutional arrangements are necessary. Persson,
Roland, and Tabellini (1997) show that joint efforts between elections and
separation of powers between legislative and executive bodies help prevent
an abuse of power by opportunistic politicians. Finally, to overcome the
lame duck problem, it might be worth paying attention to an institutional
arrangement inducing last-period government to condition a future prospect
of its well-being on its last term performance.
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